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This Note argues that the EEC and Mexico should modify their current agreement. Part I ex-
amines the terms of the EEC-Mexican Agreement. Part II discusses the changing economic factors
in the EEC and Mexico that dictate the need for a new agreement. Part III suggests modification of
the EEC-Mexican Agreement to enhance the economic relationship between the EEC and Mexico.
The Note concludes that the EEC, the second largest trading bloc in the world, should offer Mexico
greater cooperation to enable Mexico to expand its non-petroleum exports and thereby modernize
its industrial capacity. A new agreement with specific provisions designed to attain these goals
would further the economic objectives not only of Mexico, but of the EEC as well.
THE EEC-MEXICAN AGREEMENT: TIME
FOR REEVALUATION?
INTRODUCTION
In 1975, the Agreement Between the European Economic
Community and the United Mexican States (the "EEC-Mexican
Agreement" or the "Agreement")' was signed to improve bi-
lateral trade. Since the Agreement was signed, however, trade
between the parties has not increased to the level the parties
had hoped. 2  While Mexico's economy has stagnated, a
stronger European Economic Community (the "EEC" or
"Community") 3 has negotiated a series of trade agreements to
stimulate economies in other developing nations.4 In light of
the changing structure of the EEC and the changing econo-
mies of both the EEC and Mexico, the present agreement is
ineffective. It does not sufficiently promote Mexican non-pe-
troleum exports to the EEC or EEC exports of technology to
Mexico.
This Note argues that the EEC and Mexico should modify
their current agreement. Part I examines the terms of the
EEC-Mexican Agreement. Part II discusses the changing eco-
1. Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the United
Mexican States, O.J. L 247/11 (1975) [hereinafter EEC-Mexican Agreement]. This
agreement was concluded under articles 113 and 114 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community. Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 113, 114, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) at 42-43 (official English version), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 60 (1958)
(unofficial English translation) [hereinafter Treaty]. For a discussion of the EEC's
legal power to negotiate Community commercial agreements under articles 111, 113
and 114 of the Treaty, see A. PARRY &J. DINNAGE, PARRY & HARDY: EEC LAW 428-30
(2d ed. 1981).
2. See De Mateo, Mexico and the European Economic Community: Trade and Investment,
in THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND MEXICO 17 (1987) [hereinafter THE
EEC AND MEXICO].
3. The EEC originally consisted of six Member States: Belgium, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Nertherlands. Three new
members joined in 1973 with the accession of the United Kingdom, Denmark, and
Ireland. Greece acceded in 1981. Spain and Portugal became Member States in
1986. See generally F. NICHOLSON & R. EAST, FROM THE SIX TO THE TWELVE: THE EN-
LARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1987) (detailing course of successive
ECC enlargements). For an explanation of the legal basis of the EEC, see D. LASOK &
J.W. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 2-25 (3d ed. 1982).
4. See infra notes 7 1-100 and accompanying text (for a discussion of EEC agree-
ments with developing nations).
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nomic factors in the EEC and Mexico that dictate the need for
a new agreement. Part III suggests modifications of the EEC-
Mexican Agreement to enhance the economic relationship be-
tween the EEC and Mexico. This Note concludes that the
EEC, the second largest trading bloc in the world, should offer
Mexico greater cooperation to enable Mexico to expand its
non-petroleum exports and thereby modernize its industrial
capacity. A new agreement with specific provisions designed
to attain these goals would further the economic objectives not
only of Mexico, but of the EEC as well.
I. THE PRESENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE EEC AND MEXICO
A. Roots of the EEC's Developmental Trade Policies with
Developing Nations
The EEC pursues trade, agriculture, and financial aid poli-
cies in its relations with developing nations.5 Two policies mo-
tivate this approach. First, the EEC views the developing na-
tions as an expanding market for its products and technology,
as well as a source of labor, energy, and raw materials.6 Sec-
ond, the EEC seeks to develop the economic infrastructure of
its former colonies, 7 as well as other developing nations.' In
5. See Stevens, The European Community and Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, in
INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 142 (J. Lodge ed. 1983)
[hereinafter Lodge I] (analyzing foundations of European Community's policy to-
ward developing nations).
6. See K. LALL & H. CHOPRA, THE EEC AND THE THIRD WORLD xvi-xvii (1981).
7. See id. at 3. The dismantling of the European colonial structure between the
1940s and the 1970s was "one of the most historic and spectacular developments of
global significance following upon the end of "World War II." Id. The EEC is con-
cerned with economic matters. It seeks to promote the free exchange of goods, ser-
ivces, and capital between the Member States. See D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, THE
SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC 13 (1980). "[Tjhe economic integration contemplated
by the Treaty was intended to advance the long term aim of political union." Id.
(explaining economic and political undercurrents of the Treaty).
The EEC aims to play a major role in world affairs. Its major interests include:
defending its need for an open trading system and a stable monetary system, and
making its voice heard above the "mix of superpower dialogue .. .which dominates
international politics." See Prag, International Relations, in EUROPEAN UNION: THE EU-
ROPEAN COMMUNITY IN SEARCH OF A FUTURE 104 (. Lodge ed. 1986) [hereinafter
Lodge III. The EEC also has a special relationship to developing nations, because it
absorbs over 40% of their exports. See id. (for a discussion of the role of Western
Europe in world affairs).
In 1957, while negotiating the Treaty, France held a substantial empire in Africa
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pursuit of these policies, the EEC has signed agreements with
developing nations in order to establish firmly an economic
presence in these countries.
In the early 197 0s, the EEC concluded non-preferential
trade agreements with Uruguay9 and Brazil.1 ° These agree-
ments were intended to increase and diversify trade. Continu-
ing this expansion of trade and developmental contacts with
Latin American nations, the EEC began negotiating a trade
agreement with Mexico."' After two years of negotiation, the
EEC-Mexican Agreement was signed in Brussels on September
16, 1975, and entered into force on September 26, 1975.12
and outposts in the Caribbean, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Polynesia.
Belgium held the Congo (now Zaire) and the Netherlands held colonies in Asia and
the Caribbean. See E. FREY-WOUTERS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE THIRD
WORLD 13-14 (1980) (discussing French plan to associate its overseas countries and
territories with the new European Economic Community). France asserted that it
would sign the Treaty only if the EEC would establish an association agreement with
overseas countries and territoris. See id. The original six members agreed that the
non-European countries and territories that had special ties to Belgium, France, It-
aly, and the Netherlands would become associated with the EEC. See id. at 14; Treaty,
supra note 1, arts. 131-36, at 65-67; id. Implementing Conventions at 157-61. The
association agreement has two main provisions. First, it calls for establishment of a
free trade area between the EEC and the overseas countries and territories. See id
Second, it provided for the European Development Fund to grant EEC development
aid to the associated countries and territories. See id.
The African colonies achieved independence soon after 1957. See E. FREY-
WOUTERS, supra, at 14 (noting that France proposed a new convention for Euro-Afri-
can cooperation when most of its former territories achieved independence shortly
after enforcement of the Treaty of Rome).
8. See K. LALL & H. CHOPRA, supra note 6, at xv.
9. Trade Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the East-
ern Republic of Uruguay, O.J. L 333/2 (1973); see A. PARRY & J. DINNAGE, supra note
1, at 479 (for a brief discussion of the EEC agreements with Latin American nations).
10. Trade Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the
Federal Republic of Brazil, OJ. L 102/24 (1974); see A. PARRY & J. DINNAGE, supra
note 1, at 479. In 1980, the EEC concluded a new agreement with Brazil. Frame-
work Agreement of September 21, 1980. For Cooperation Between the European
Economic Community and the Federative Republic of Brazil, O.J.L. 281/2 (1982)
[hereinafter EEC-Brazil Agreement].
11. Relations with Latin American Countries, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3871, at
3099 (Agreement with Mexico) [hereinafter Latin American Relations]. The EEC-
Mexican Agreement departs from earlier agreements concluded with other Latin
American countries, such as Argentina in 1971 and Uruguay in 1973, because it aims
to develop and diversify trade between the parties through the cooperation of both
parties. See id.
12. See EEC-Mexican Agreement, supra note 1. The two-year negotiation pro-
cess when Luis Echeverria, then President of Mexico, visited the Commission be-
tween April 7-9, 1973. See President of Mexico Visits the Commission, E.C. Bull. No.
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While the Agreement itself states the common goals
shared by both the EEC and Mexico, each party had separate
agendas. Mexico sought to increase exports to the nine na-
tions that then comprised the EEC.'3 Primarily, Mexico
wanted to reduce its economic dependence on trade with the
United States.' 4 Finally, Mexico needed Community assistance
to speed economic growth, diversify industrial activity, develop
natural resources, and provide technological innovation.'
5
For its part, the EEC wanted to develop a higher level of
trade with Mexico. The EEC recognized Mexico's special situ-
ation as a developing nation and sought to extend its already
established policy of cooperation with developing countries.
At this time, the EEC had entered into negotiations with forty-
six developing African, Carribean, and Pacific States in prepa-
ration for the ACP-EEC Convention of Lome ("Lom6 I").I6
4, 2315 (1973). President Echeverria expressed hope that economic cooperation
between Mexico and the Community would help resolve the problems Mexico faced
in its international relations. Id. In March 1975, the Council authorized the Commis-
sion to begin negotiations for a non-preferential agreement between Mexico and the
Community. Mexico, E.C. Bull. No. 3, 2344 (1975). This agreement would be
based on commercial cooperation between the parties. Id. Before the negotiations
opened, Sir Christopher Soames, Vice-President of the European Commission, vis-
ited Mexico to talk with President Echeverria and the Mexican Ministers for Foreign
Affairs and Industry and Commerce. Official Visit by Sir Christopher Soames, E.C.
Bull. No 4. 2348 (1975). The talks related to Mexico's prospects for relations with
the Communities. Id.
On April 29, 1975, negotiations between the EEC and Mexico opened in Brus-
sels. Id. The first round, which lasted two days, concentrated on the major issues of
the contemplated Agreement. Id. These included "development and diversification
of trade through commerical and economic cooperation." Id. 2349. The negotia-
tions concluded on June 9 & 10, 1975. See Mexico, E.C. Bull. No. 6 2351 (1975).
13. See Spokesman's Group of the Commission of the European Communities,
EEC-Mexico Agreement, Information Memo (July 1975) [hereinafter Information
Memo] (available at the Fordham International Law Journal office).
14. See id. By 1972, two-thirds of Mexico's 300 largest industrial firms were
based in the United States. See S. WEINTRAUB, FREE TRADE BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE
UNITED STATES? 17 (1984).
15. See COMMISSION, SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES in 1973, at 432 (1974); Information Memo, supra note 13.
16. ACP-EEC Conventioh of Lom6, Council Regulation No. 199/76, OJ. L
25/1 (1976),[hereinafter Lom6 I]; see Information Memo, supra note 13; infra note 71
(for historical explanation and discussion of the goals of Lom6 Convention). See gen-
erally, C. TWITCHETr, A FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT: THE EEC AND THE ACP
(1981) (giving an overview of link between EEC and ACP States).
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B. The Present EEC-Mexican Agreement
In the Agreement, the EEC and Mexico grant each other
most-favored-nation treatment 7  in customs duties and
charges, taxes, and quantity of imports and exports.1 8 As a re-
sult of this provision, Mexico and the EEC agreed to grant
each other any trade advantages that are extended to third
countries.19 In theory, no third country shall have better trade
relations with either Mexico or the EEC than they have with
each other. By a subsequent provision, however, these provi-
sions do not apply to advantages that either party grants to
neighboring countries or to advantages that Mexico grants to
Latin American or Carribean countries.2z
17. See EEC-Mexican Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2, O.J. L 247/11, at 12. Arti-
cles 2 states that the parties shall grant most-favored-nation treatment in all matters
relating to the following:
-customs duties and charges of all kinds on imports or exports, including
the, procedures for collecting such duties and charges;
-regulations concerning customs clearance, transit, warehousing or tran-
shipment of imported or exported products;
-taxes and other internal charges directly or indirectly imposed on im-
ported or exported goods or services;
-arrangements governing the quantity of imports and exports;
-regulations concerning payments in respect of trade in goods or services,
including the allocation of foreign currency and the transfer of such pay-
ments;
-regulations affecting the sale, purchase, transport, distribution and use of
goods and services on the internal market.
Id.'art. 2(1), at 12; see D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 7, at 18 (for discussion of
the "most-favored-nation" principle). The most-favored-nation principle implies
that "any privilege or favor granted by a contracting party to the products of any
other country in respect of customs duties or charges shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to similar products originating in the territory of any other con-
tracting party." Id. The Agreement also makes exceptions to this principle, such as
advantages that the contracting parties grant to particular countries in conformity
with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), opened for signature Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. See EEC-Mexican Agree-
ment, supra note 1, art. 2(2), at 12.
The most-favored-nation clause was essential to the EEC-Mexican Agreement,
because at the time of the negotiation, all nine members of the EEC were signatories
to GATT, which contains a general most-favored-nation provision for all signatories.
See D. WYArr & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 7, at 18-19. Mexico, however, was not then
a member of GATT and did not become a signatory to GATT until 1987. See U.S.
DEPT. OF STATE TREATIES IN FORCE 303-04 (1988) (listing all signatories, including
Mexico, to GATT as ofJanuary 1, 1988).
18. See EEC-Mexican Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 1-2, at 12.
19. See supra note 17 (explaining the most-favored-nation treatment).
20. See EEC-Mexican Agreement, supra note 1,.art. 2(2), at 12. Article 2(2) states
that the most-favored-nation privilege shall not apply to the following:
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The Agreement speaks in general terms of promoting the
development and diversification of trade 2' and economic coop-
eration between Mexico and the EEC.22 To achieve these
goals, the Agreement encourages economic operators and in-
stitutions to undertake practical economic cooperation
projects. 23 While the Agreement encourages economic coop-
eration, it does not specify the areas in which the parties shall
cooperate. 24 Furthermore, the Agreement does not provide fi-
nancial incentives to encourage institutions to undertake coop-
eration projects. 25
To ensure the proper functioning of the agreement, Mex-
ico and the EEC agreed to create the EEC-Mexico Joint Com-
mittee (the "Joint Committee"). 26 The Joint Committee has
(a) advantages granted by Contracting Parties to neighboring countries to
facilitate frontier-zone traffic;
(b) advantages granted by the Contracting Parties with the object of estab-
lishing a customs union or a free trade area or as required by such a customs
union or free trade area;
(c) advantages which the Contracting Parties grant to particular countries
in conformity with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;
(d) advantages which Mexico grants to certain countries in accordance
with the Protocol on trade negotiations between developing countries in the
context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;
(e) other advantages granted or to be granted by Mexico to any Latin
American or Caribbean country or group of countries.
Id.
21. See id. art. 3, at 12. Article 3 states that "[t]he Contracting Parties undertake
to promote the development and diversifiation of their reciprocal trade to the highest
possible level." Id.
22. See id. art. 4, at 12. Article 4 states that "[tihe Contracting Parties will de-
velop their economic cooperation, where linked with trade, in fields of mutual inter-
est and in light of developments in their economic policies." Id.
23. See id. art. 5, at 12. Article 5 states that "[w]ith a view to implementing Arti-
cles 3 and 4, the Contracting Parties agree to promote contracts and cooperation
between their economic operators and institutions with a view to undertaking practi-
cal economic cooperation projects which are likely to contribute to the development
and diversification of their trade." Id.
24. See Coffey, Co-operation Between the European Economic Community and Latin
America-with Special Reference to Mexico: A European View, in THE EEC AND MEXICO,
supra note 2, at 29, 33 (Agreement is "much too general in scope and quality").
25. See Reyes, Industrial Policy in Mexico: Problems, Objectives and Relationship to the
EEC, in THE EEC AND MEXICO, supra note 2, at 98 (Mexico must make a substantial
effort to attract high-tech industries).
26. See EEC-Mexican Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6, at 12. The Joint Commit-
tee has several functions. First, it must study practical trade problems between the
Community and Mexico and, where possible, propose solutions for them. A. PARRY
& J. DINNAGE, supra note 1, at 479; LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS, supra note 11, at
3099. For example, where there are specific barriers to trade, products, or indus-
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arranged conferences between European and Mexican firms to
discuss joint ventures,27 supported projects to develop geo-
thermal energy28 and agricultural research, 29 and obtained fi-
nancial assistance from the EEC for displaced population
groups. °
The EEC-Mexican Agreement contains an evolutionary
clause that provides for amplification to cover any additional
issues. 31 The parties may amend the Agreement in considera-
tion of new situations in the economic policies of either side.32
tries, the Joint Commission can propose measures to expand the trade relationship.
Id. Second, the Joint Commission is to encourage Mexico to use the generalized
system effectively in order to promote EEC-Mexican trade. Id. Third, the Joint Com-
mission must see that all parties benefit from the agreement by promoting the ex-
change of information and contacts between Community firms and investors and
Mexico, as well as seeing that projects are completed. Mexico, E.C. Bull. No. 6
2345 (1975). However, the degree to which Community investors would participate
in Mexican development projects depend on the extent to which Mexico could attract
them to profitable operations.
27. See Spokesman's Group of the European Communities, EEC-Mexico Joint
Commission, Memo 17/87 (Feb. 10, 1987) (not-attributable) [hereinafter Joint Com-
mission Memo] (available at the Fordham International Law Journal office). For its part,
the Community believed that face-to-face counsultation among EEC and Mexican
businesses was essential to industrial cooperation. Id. at 2. In pursuit of this cooper-
ation, the European Commission and the Mexican authorities arranged several "en-
counters" in Guadalajara in December 1984. Id. During these encounters, approxi-
mately 100 European firms met with potential Mexican partners to discuss proposals
for future cooperation. Id.
28. Id. at 3. There have been several projects in the field of energy cooperation.
They include Community assistance to develop Mexican geothermal energy, two
studies on methods by which Mexico could use energy and energy policy rationally,
and the creation of reliable instruments to forecast future energy supply and de-
mand. Id.
29. Id. A European and a Mexican institute conducted a joint research program
in the field of tropical agriculture. Id. The project was called "Conversion of tropical
agricultural production into animal feed by fermentation." This project was in-
tended to reduce Mexico's requirements for grain imports by developing methods to
convert the waste of tropical agriculture, such as leaves, into animal feed. Id.
30. Id. During 1985 and 1986, the EEC provided financial assistance for several
development cooperation projects in Mexico, which assisted displaced population
groups, gave food aid, and allocated money for the construction of a hospital. Id.
31. See EEC-Mexican Agreement, supra note 1, art. 12, at 13; Latin American Rela-
tions, supra note 11.
32. See EEC-Mexican Agreement, supra note 1, art. 12, at 13.
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II. THE CHANGING ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
EEC AND MEXICO
During the 1980s, Mexico has suffered a severe recession
and faces problems repaying foreign debt.33 At the same time,
the EEC has embarked upon a program to establish a single
market within the Community by 1992. 34 As its economic
power has increased, the EEC has begun to expand its trade
31agreements with developing nations.
A. Recession and Foreign Debt in Mexico
From 1940 through 1976, Mexico experienced high rates
of real growth, even though its domestic industries were main-
tained at high CoSt. 3 6 Thus, Mexico entered into the EEC-Mex-
ican Agreement during a time of relative economic prosperity
with the intention of expanding this prosperity.
In the late 1970s, however, this economic growth did not
outpace inflation.3 v The Mexican government devalued the
peso in 1976, destabilizing the economy. 38 The government
33. See infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
34. See Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987). See generally Lodge II, supra
note 7 (discussing political and economic implications of proposed European Union).
35. See infra notes 71-100 (discussing Lom6 Agreements and other trade agree-
ments between the EEC and Latin American nations).
36. See Sinkin, The Mexican Economy in Crisis, in LEFLER, DOING BUSINESS IN MEX-
ico § 3.02, at 3-3 (1985) (discussing ultimate downfall of Mexico's program to pro-
duce goods domestically).
Mexico's program of import substitution industrialization ("ISI") development
between 1940-1976 encouraged the production of products that were intended to
service the domestic market, decreasing the competitiveness of Mexican goods
abroad. Thus, ISI sought to decrease Mexico's dependence on both foreign ex-
change and imported goods. Id. Mexican goods did not have to compete in interna-
tional markets because ISI was intended to supply consumer goods to the Mexican
market. Id. Mexican goods were produced inefficiently and at a high cost relative to
other nations. Id. Consequently, Mexican goods could not be exported to foreign
markets and, therefore, could not contribute to Mexico's foreign exchange earnings
Id. For a discussion of ISI, see Hirschman, The Political Economy of Import Substituting
Industrialization in Latin America, 82 QJ. ECON. 1 (1968). Notably, the government did
to administer the program well and many of the developmental projects were never
completed. Street, Mexico's Developmental Crisis, CURRENT HIST., Mar. 1987, at 101.
37. See Sinkin, supra note 36, § 3.02, at 3-4.. For a discussion of Mexico's poor
financial and fiscal management, see Street, supra note 36, at 101-01.
38. See Sinkin, supra note 36, § 3.02, at 3-4. By 1976, inflation outpaced eco-
nomic growth and population growth had reached nearly 3.5%. Id. The ISI model
was not able to sustain economic growth. Id. The failure of the ISI model caused a
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attempted to revitalize the nation chiefly through development
of its oil industry. 9 While the initial success of Mexico's oil
industry brought increased revenue to the country, it did not
stabilize the economy. 40 This influx of currency, chasing a lim-
ited supply of goods and services, caused inflation to increase
to 27.9% in 1981 and caused an import binge.4 Furthermore,
the high price of Mexican goods destroyed the export market
for non-petroleum products.42 As a result, deficits increased in
Mexico's trade balance and in the current account of its bal-
ance of payments. 4' During the early 1980s, Mexico borrowed
severe economic crisis in 1976, and a devaluation of the peso just as a new presiden-
tial administration was taking office. Id. Consequently, PresidentJos6 L6pez Portillo
faced an unstable economic situation when he took office. Id.
It should be noted that the term of office of the President of the Republic is six
years and that he is ineligible for reelection, One political party, the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (known as the P.R.I.) has controlled the presidency since 1929.
See Robter, Can He Save Mexico?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20 1988, § 6 (Magazine), at 34.
39. See Sinkin, supra note 36, § 3.02, at 3-1 to 3-5. The L6pez Portillo adminis-
tration planned to stabilize the economic situation and then increase domestic de-
mand to promote economic growth. Id. To restrict inflation, however, the adiminis-
tration planned to increase both production and imports. Id. Oil was the main
player in the strategy, because the Mexican national oil company, PEMEX, had an-
nounced huge new discoveries of petroleum reserves in southern Mexico in late
1976. The government contemplated that the new national growth strategy would
be paid for by oil export revenues and foreign borrowing. Id. By 1978, the program
to expand exports of oil began to have positive results. Mexico was a major exporter
of oil during a global energy crisis. Id.; see Street, supra note 36, at 101. Between
1978 and 1981, the Mexican economy grew by an annual rate of 8.4%, while the
value of Mexican exports grew from US$9.3 billion in 1979 to US$19.8 billion in
1981. Sinkin, supra note 36, § 3.02, at 3-5. Also during this period, public expendi-
ture increased rapidly, real per capita income increased, and unemployment fell. Id.
Sinkin, supra note 36, § 3.02, at 304 to 3-5. For an analysis of the financial policies
followed between 1970 and 1985 by the Mexican oil sector, run by PEMEX, see
Wionczek, Mexico's External Debt and the Oil Question, THE EEC AND MExIco 57, 77-82
(1987).
40. See Sinkin, supra note 36, § 3.02, at 3-6. Moreover, massive amounts of for-
eign debt fueled the expansion of Mexico's oil industry. See Thurow, Bordering on
Disaster, NEWSWEEK, June 14, 1982, at 78, col. 1.
41. See Sinkin, supra note 36, § 3.02, at 3-6. Mexicans purchased from abroad
because the peso was highly overvalued. Id. As cheaper imports rapidly entered
Mexico, Mexican non-petroleum exports collapsed. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. The balance of payments is the method of recording all of a particular
country's economic transactions with those of the rest of the world during a fixed
peribd of time. J. DOWNES &J. GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT
TERMS 27-28 (2d ed. 1987). It is usually divided into three accounts, the current,
capital, and gold accounts, which can show a surplus or deficit. Id. Imports and ex-
ports of goods and services are listed in the current account. Id. at 27-28. The capi-
tal account tracks investments. Gold transactions are noted in the gold account. Id.
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in the international capital markets to cover these huge defi-
cits.
4 4
The drop in oil revenues in 1981 triggered a collapse in
the Mexican economy in 1982.45 Since then, Mexico has ex-
perienced negative growth rates, soaring inflation, and massive
trade imbalances.46 The value of the peso has fluctuated wildly
A country may assess its comparative economic strengths and weaknesses with the
balance of payments. Id.
44. See Sinkin, supra note 36, § 30.2, at 3-6. For a discussion of underlying legal
problems regarding the Mexican borrowing during the 1970s and early 1980s, see
Pando. The Mexican Debt Crisis in Perspective. Faulty Legal Structures and Afterhocks, 23
TEX. INT'L LJ. 171-231 (1988).
As a result of oil exports, Mexicans had enormous amounts of currency to spend,
but a limited quantity of goods and services upon which to spend it. Id. This situa-
tion increased inflationary pressure, and by 1981 inflation reached 27.9% annually.
Id. In response, the government increased the value of the peso, thus reducing the
cost of imported goods relative to Mexican goods. Id. The overvalued peso caused a
flood of imported goods into Mexico and, at the same time, a collapse in the export
market for Mexican non-petroleum products. Id. Mexico's deficits in its trade bal-
ance and in its current account of the balance of payments increased because of the
economic situation. Id. Between 1980 and 1981, Mexico's trade balance deficit grew
from -US$2.83 billion to -US$4.1 billion, while its current accounts defict grew
from -US$4.8 billion in 1979 to -US$11.7 billion in 1981. Id.
During the six yers of the L6pez Portillo administration, Mexico borrowed ap-
proximately US $10 billion annually to cover its deficits. Id. After 1977, the external
debt increased at a rapid pace: US$22.91 billion at the end of 1977, US$26.26 billion
in December 1978, US$52.96 billion in December 1981, and US$58.87 billion in De-
cember 1982. See Pando, supra at 183.
Mexico's foreign debt was large and poorly structured. Sinkin., supra note 36,
§ 3.02, at 3-7. Approximately 15% of Mexico's 1981 deficit was financed by short-
term loans and approximately 85% was financed by medium term loans. Id. The
debt service payments increased during every year of the L6pez Portillo administra-
tion except 1981. See Sinkin, supra note 36, § 3.02, at 3-7. Over 30% of exports were
allocated for payments. See id.
As debt service increased, the average maturity period for all loans to Mexico
dropped from 13.7 to 7.7 years between 1972 and 1981. Id. At the same time, inter-
est rates rose on these loans from 6.9% to 15% on average. Id.
45. See Sinkin, supra note 36, § 3.01, at 3-1 to 3-2. See generally Wionczek, supra
note 39, at 57. The Mexican government found itself confronting a "witch's brew of
staggering unemployment, rising inflation and pyramiding foreign debts." Mexico's
Petroleum Hangover, TIME, Mar. 29, 1982, at 50, col. 1.
46. See Sinkin, supra note 36, § 3.01, at 3-1 to 3-2. In 1982 and 1983, Mexico's
economy contracted, it grew in 1984, and was stagnant in 1985. Id. The sharp de-
cline in oil prices in 1986 worsened the Mexican economy. See id. By 1986, Mexico
depended on oil exports to pay its US$97 billion foreign debt. When the price of oil
dropped from US$21 to US$20 during 1986, Mexico faced a US$2 billion annual loss
in earnings. See Buchanan, De La Madrid is Dilthering While Mexico's Debt Fuse Burns,
Bus. WK. Feb. 17, 1986, at 50, col. 2; see also 1986-1987 Eur. Parl. Deb. (No. 340) 68
(Oct. 6, 1986) (discussing how sharp fall in the price of oil represents a serious threat
to development of countries such as Mexico, because they finance greater part of
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during these crisis years, and the inflation rate has averaged
over sixty percent since the 1982 collapse.47
Furthermore, the drop in oil prices in 1982 caused for-
eign investors as well as Mexicans to withdraw their money
from Mexico. 4' This flight of capital prevented Mexico from
meeting payments on its foreign debt and deprived it of funds
with which to develop its industrial infrastructure in non-pe-
troleum products. 49 Today, non-petroleum products comprise
their imports with proceeds of oil, and it is extremely difficult for them to service
their foreign debt under these conditions).
47. See Sinkin, supra note 36, § 3.01, at 3-2. Inefficient import substitution, inad-
equate effective demand, and decelerating productivity growth in both rural and ur-
ban activities led to increasing income inequalities, inefficient industrialization be-
hind protective tariffs, and a growing balance of payment problems. See id. § 3.02, at
3-3; see also Reyes, supra note 25, at 92 (noting the though Mexican manufacturing
output grew rapidly until 1981, efficiency levels were far below those prevailing in
industry in developed countries).
48. See Sinkin, supra note 36, § 3.03, at 3-8 to 3-9. In 1982, three forces com-
bined to cause a drastic fall in oil prices: conservation, a recession in the United
States and new oil sources. Id.
49. See id. On the verge of bankruptcy in 1982, Mexico received massive finan-
cial assistance from international banks and financial institutions. See id. § 3.03, at 3-
10; Street, supra note 36, at 103. By February 1982, the Mexican economy was in
crisis.
The government depleted public-sector finances in order to service the foreign
debt. See Sinkin, supra note 36, § 3.03, at 3-9. Meanwhile, international reserves sunk
to very low levels and inflation soared. To prevent the economy from falling further,
the government devalued the peso by 67%, from 26.5 to 46 to the dollar. See id.
The International Monetary Fund ("IMF") pressured international creditors to
delay all payments due on the public sector debt for 90 days. Id. § 3.03, at 3-10. At
the same time, Mexican authorities sought to reschedule payments on its debt and to
obtain a loan from the IMF. Id. See Preusse, Latin American Foreign Debt and the Interna-
tional Financial System, in THE EEC AND MEXico 39, 40 (1987) (relating Mexico's 1982
debt rescheduling to international debt crisis). In November, 1982, the Mexican gov-
ernment reached a three-year accord with the IMF, which called for a severe austerity
program. See Sinkin, supra note 36, § 3.03, at 3-11; Street, supra note 36, at 103. This
program included "limitations on public sector borrowing, increases in taxes, a sig-
nificant lowering of inflation, elimination or reductions of government subsidies and
price controls for basic goods and services." See Sinkin, supra note 36, § 3.03, at 3-11.
The program also called for substantial reductions in the deficit as a percentage of
the GDP and the systematic undervaluation of the peso to stimulate non-petroleum
exports and to reduce imports. See id. Street, supra note 36, at 103.
On July 22, 1986, Mexico and the IMF signed another in a series of agreements
to delay payment of Mexico's US$97.6 billion debt obligation. See Sander, Interna-
tional Debt: IMF-Mexico Stand-By Agreement, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 157 (1987).
In this agreement, the IMF offered a series of prescriptions to Mexico intended
to encourage long-term economic growth. Id. Thus, for the first time, the IMF fa-
vored economic growth instead of "the traditional demands for economic austerity
normally forced upon the debtor country." Id. In exchange, Mexico agreed to make
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fifteen percent of Mexico's exports to the EEC.50
The economic crisis continues today in Mexico, highlight-
ing the disparity between the Mexican and European econo-
mies. 51 Mexico no longer wants assistance to expand on pros-
perity. Rather, it urgently needs to improve its trade relation-
ship with the EEC 52 so that it may import advanced technology
and export non-petroleum manufactured products.
B. Changes in the EEC: The Second Enlargement
and the Single European Act
The second enlargement of the EEC, which took place
during the 1980s, has affected the EEC's relations with Mex-
ico." The entry of Greece, Spain, and Portugal into the EEC
has major implications on the EEC's trade and economic rela-
changes in economic policy and institute tax reform. See Back to the Brink in Mexico,
Bus. WK, June 23, 1986, at 12, col. 2; Wildstrom, The Big Risks in Baker's Mexican
Bailout, Bus. WK., Aug. 4, 1986, at 35, col. 2.
50. See De Mateo, supra note 2, at 16. If oil is excluded, Mexico's total exports to
the EEC underwent zero growth between 1979-84. See id.
51. For example, the gross domestic product in purchasers' value in Mexico
during 1984 was approximately US$171,298 million. See THE EUROPA YEARBOOK
1839-40 (Europa Publications, Ltd. ed. 1988). During the same year, the gross do-
mestic product in purchasers' values was US$595,893 million in the Federal Republic
of Germany. See id. at 1160-61. It was US$476,666 million in France. See id. at 1045.
The GDP at market prices was US$427,776 million in the United Kingdom. See id. at
2784-85. The gross domestic product at factor cost was US$353,667 million in Italy.
See id. at 1479. See generally De Mateo, supra note 2, at 10-12 (for a statistical compari-
son of the Mexican and Latin America economies during the early 1980s).
52. See 1986-1987 Eur. Parl. Deb. (No. 340) 60 (Oct. 6, 1986). In a talk endors-
ing an improved trading system between the EEC and Mexico, Mr van Aerssen
stated:
A strong expansion of world trade was also the best way of helping countries
in difficulties to work out a long-term solution to their problems. ... I also
agree that the problems have since become more acute because of the dras-
tic fall in export earnings by those countries which are oil exporters.
A country for which we currently cherish warm feelings is Mexico,
which is hosting the World Cup-an event which I hope, brings the Nations
closer together. Mexico alone has lost 2.75 billion DM this year in export
revenues. The interest on that country's foreign debt is greater than its
earnings from oil. As the previous speaker said, that is a dramtaic [sic] situa-
tion. The fact that we are discussing the matter here does not mean that the
Commission should now come up with proposals for a kind of Lom6 Con-
vention with the states of Latin America. What we want is a multilateral
open trading system, and we want to push this through in the long term in
GATT, even if it takes a few years.
Id.
53. See generally F. NICHOLSON & R. EAST, supra note 3 (for comprehensive back-
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tions with Mexico.54 EEC aid to Mexico may suffer due to sev-
eral factors. These new Member States have agricultural sec-
tors and lower levels of development than the other Member
States.55 Therefore, they require aid from the Community in
order to integrate fully. 56 Competing demands on funds to re-
duce regional disparities and to restructure the productive
base within the three new Member States are likely to restrict
comparable assistance programs aimed towards the economies
of non-member developing nations, such as Mexico. 57 During
the present transitional period after their entry, the new states
are receiving much EEC money to modernize their economies
and prepare for competition. 58  For example, Portugal re-
ceived 137 billion escudos from the Community during its first
two years of membership. 9 Between January 1986 and March
1988, more than two-thirds of the new capital in Portugal came
from other EEC countries.60
On the other hand, the accession of Greece, Spain, and
Portugal may improve trade relations between the EEC and
Mexico in several ways. For example, new markets on
favorable terms may become available to developing nations,
because the three new nations must now adjust their tariffs to
conform with those already established within the EEC.6 '
Thus, their tariffs would be lowered to match those that the
EEC currently grants to Mexico.
ground of the EEC's second enlargement). New Member States become parties to
prior EEC treaties with foreign states.
When a new country joins the Community, it must ratify existing agreements
between the EEC and non-member countries by the normal procedure of that coun-
try. Id. at 274. The existing agreement is generally modified by protocol to include
the new Member State. Id.
54. See D. SEERS & C. VAITSOS, THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF THE EEC 216-24
(1982).
55. See id. at 216.
56. See id. at 216-19.
57. See id.
58. See A Survey of Portugal: Another New World, ECONOMIST, May 28, 1988, survey
at 4, col. 1.
59. See id. survey at 14, col. 2.
60. See id. survey at 17, col. 1.
61. See D. SEERS & C. VAITSOS, supra note 54, at 220-2 1. For example, Spanish
tariffs for coffee and cocoa beans prior to accession were about 22.5% and 30% re-
spectively. Id. at 221. The EEC tarriffs on the same products that originate in Africa,
the Carribean, and the Pacific (the "ACP States") were between 4 and 5% in the early
1980s. Id.
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The strong trade relations between Spain and Mexico will
strengthen the ties between the EEC and Mexico. Due to its
historical and cultural links with Mexico, Spain wants the EEC
to extend its Lom6 Convention to that part of the world.62 Ad-
ditionally, Spain imports a large volume of goods from Mex-
ico. 6 1
In addition, EEC-Mexican relations are likely to be af-
fected by the Community's drive towards a single market with
no trade barriers. The Single European Act 64 was signed in
February, 1986, by all twelve Member States of the European
Community.65 The EEC will become the largest trading bloc
in the world if it achieves its goal of an "internal market" set
for 1992.66 It will comprise forty percent of all foreign trade.67
This market would rival the United States in scope and world-
wide influence.68
Non-Europeans fear that access to the sheltered European
market will be a privilege that will cost money.6 9 This has neg-
ative implications for trade between the EEC and Mexico since
the outside world views European integration as a "fortress
blocking .. .improvements in the rules of world trade." 7 °
62. See Brooke, Europe's Old Colonies Are Getting Anxious as 1992 Nears, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 1, 1989, § 4, at 4 (noting the Spain and Portugal want to extend to Latin America
trade and aid benefits that Europe now gives the Lom6 countries). But see EEC: Lomi
Convention: No WayJose, ECONOMIST, Apr. 9, 1988, at 48, col. 1 (noting that it is un-
likely that Latin American nations will become parties to the fourth Lom6 Conven-
tion, for which negotiations are now opening).
63. See THE EUROPA YEARBOOK, supra note 51, at 1842. During 1985, Spain im-
ported Mexican goods worth US$17 billion. See id.
64. See Single European Act, supra note 34. Several goals can be inferred from
the Single European Act: to update and expand upon existing treaties, to set up a
single institutional framework for the union, and to render the institutions estab-
lished by the Community more democratic, effective, and accountable than they have
been. See Lodge II, supra note 7, at 8.
65. See Single European Act, supra note 34, at 21-23.
66. See de St. Phalle, And Now, the Tiger of Europe, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1988, at
A35, cols. 2-3. Project 1992 aims to create a Common Market in which goods, peo-
ple, services, and capital could move without obstacles. See A Survey of Europe's Internal
Market, ECONOMIST, July 9, 1988, survey at 5, col.2.
67. See id.
68. See id. at col. 3.
69. See The Shape of Europe's Trade, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 1988, at 13, col. 2.
70. Id. at 14, col. 1.
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C. EEC Agreements with Developing Nations
1. Lom6
In 1975, the EEC and the African, Carribean, and Pacific
States (the "ACP States") signed Lom6 I to accelerate the eco-
nomic progress of the ACP States.7' Lom6 I allowed almost all
ACP products access to the EEC free of customs duties.72
The agreement was intended to strengthen the economic
infrastructures in the ACP States, increase the use of market
and sales promotion schemes,7 3 and encourage rural develop-
ment, training programs, and industrial development.7" To
71. Lom& I, supra note 16. The first Lom6 Convention was signed on February
28, 1975. Its duration was five years. The First ACP/EEC Convention of Lomb,
General Note, EEC Encyclopedia B12-522 [hereinafter General Note]. It replaced
the Second Yaound6 Convention of Association Between the European Economic
Community and the African and Malagasy Associated States (the "Second Yaound6
Convention, J.O. L 282/2 (1970) and the Internal Agreement of September 24,
1969, on the Measures to be Taken Applying the Agreement Establishing an Associa-
tion Between the European Economic Community and the United Republic of
Tanzania, the Republic of Uganda and the Republic of Kenya and the Procedures to
be Followed Therein, (the "Arusha Convention") J.O. L 282/80 (1970). For a brief
explanation of the Lom6 Convention, see D. LASOx & J.W. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at
44-45. The Lom6 Convention was concluded between the nine Member States of
EEC and 46 developing ACP States. It required ratification by all nine Member
States of the EEC and by two-thirds of the ACP signatories. See Lom6 I, supra note
16, art. 87, at 29. The Convention also anticipated the possibility of accession on the
part of any other developing states that have an economic and productive structure
comparable to that of the ACP States. There was a reservation that such accession
have the consent of both the Member States of the EEC and of the ACP States. See id.
art. 90, at 30.
The purpose of the agreement was to produce a structure to accelerate the eco-
nomic progress and social development of the ACP States. General Note, supra,
B12-522. The provisions regarding trade and commercial cooperation stressed free
access to the EEC for almost all products from the ACP States and the non-reciproc-
ity of trade obligations. Id. Most ACP products were admitted to the EEC free from
customs duties and without being subject to quantitative restrictions. Id. The EEC
did not receive any reverse preferences. Id. The one obligation imposed on the ACP
signatories was to accord EEC Member States most-favored-nation treatment. Id.
For a discussion of the Lom Convention and its effect on EEC relations with devel-
oping nations, see E. FREY-WOUTERS, supra note 7.
While the Second Yaound6 Convention was responsive to the problems of the
relations of former colonies to the EEC, Lom6 I and its renewals reflect the develop-
ments in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD")
from 1964 and, most importantly, the developments in GATT. See E. FREY-
WOUTERS, supra note 7 at 181; C. TWITCHEF-r, supra note 16, at 52.
72. See General Note, supra note 71, B12-522.
73. See id. B12-524.
74. See id.
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achieve these goals, the Community supported ACP regional
and inter-regional cooperation schemes, provided specific aid
to small and medium-sized firms and small-scale development
schemes, and provided special aid to the least developed coun-
tries.75
Lom& I forged particular paths to realize these goals. For
example, the EEC agreed to foster industrial development in
the ACP States by (1) facilitating the transfer of technology,76
(2) promoting the marketing of ACP industrial products in for-
eign states, 7 7 and (3) encouraging Community firms to partici-
pate in ACP development. 78
Subsequent Lom6 conventions have targeted precisely the
ways in which the EEC would aid the ACP States. For exam-
ple, in the Second ACP-EEC Conference of Lom6 ("Lom6
II"), 7 9 the EEC offered financial and technical assistance to
produce and distribute energy in the ACP States.8" In 1985,
the Third ACP-EEC Conference of Lome ("Lome III")81 pro-
vided that the EEC would advance industry in the ACP States
through the development of small and medium-sized enter-
prises. 82 As a result of the Lom6 process, cooperation between
the EEC and ACP nations has greatly increased.83
75. See Lom6 I, supra note 16, arts. 7-13, at 106-07; General Note, supra note 71,
at B12-524.
76. See Lomb I, supra note 16, art. 26, at 17.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Second ACP-EEC Convention of Lomb, Council Regulation No. 3225/80,
O.J. L 347/1 (1980) [hereinafter Lom6 I]; see General Note, supra note 71, B12-
547. On March 1, 1980 the First ACP-EEC Convention of Lom6 expired. General
Note, supra note 71, B12-52611. The Second ACP-EEC Convention was signed in
Lom6, Republic of Togo, on October 31, 1979. Lom6 II, supra, at 26. Twelve ACP
States signed Lom6 II who were not signatories to Lomb I. General Note, supra note
71, B 12-526/1. The new treaty devoted a title to the needs of the least developed
and land-locked countries. Lomb II, supra, tit. VIII, at 53-54.
80. Lom6 II, supra note 79, arts. 72, 76 at 27-28; see General Note, supra note 71,
B 12-526/8.
81. Third ACP-EEC Convention of Lom&, Council Regulatoin No. 86/127, O.J.
L 86/1 (1986) [hereinafter Lom6 III]; see also General Note, supra note 71, B12-
526/8.
82. Lomb III, supra note 81, art. 67, at 29. The Community offered to assist
development of ACP technology by implementing research programs. Lom6 III,
supra note 81, art. 68, at 29-30.
83. See M. Hauswirth, Meeting Point, 97 COURIER 4 (May-June 1986). Since Lom6
I, European development activities in the ACP States have become an increasingly
important part of Community development aid. See id. In particular, the European
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2. Latin America
While updating the Lom6 conventions, the EEC has be-
gun to improve its trade agreements with some Latin American
countries. During the 1980s, the EEC signed new agreements
with Brazil,84 the Andean Group,85 and the Central American
Countries.8 6 These agreements are intended to provide spe-
cific areas of trade cooperation between the EEC and Latin
America.87
In 1982, the EEC signed the Framework Agreement for
Cooperation Between the European Economic Community
and the Federative Republic of Brazil (the "EEC-Btazil Agree-
ment").88  This agreement specifies that the EEC will en-
courage scientific and technological progress in Brazil. 9 It
Development Fund has provided for the construction of ports, dams, and many miles
of roads. See id.
84. EEC-Brazil Agreement, supra note 10.
85. Cooperation Agreement Between the European Economic Community, of
the One Part, and the Cartagena Agreement and the Member Countries Thereof-
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela-of the Other Part, O.J. L 153/2
(1984) [hereinafter EEC-Andean Group Agreement].
86. Cooperation Agreement Between the European Economic Community, of
the One Part, and the Countries Parties to the General Treaty on Central American
Economic Integration (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicara-
gua) and Panama, of Other Part, OJ. L. 172/2 (1986) [hereinafter EEC-Central
American Agreement].
87. See infra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
88. See EEC-Brazil Agreement, supra note 10.
89. See EEC-Brazil Agreement, supra note 10, art. 3, at 3. Article 3 states:
1. The Contracting Parties, in the light of their mutual interests and taking
into account their long-term economic aspirations, shall foster economic co-
operation in all fields deemed suitable by the Parties. Among the objectives
of such cooperation shall be:
- to encourage the development and prosperity of their respective indus-
tries.
- to open up new sources of supply and new markets,
- to encourage scientific and technological progress,
- generally to contribute to the development of their respective economics
and standards of living.
2. As a means to such ends, the Contracting Parties shall endeavor inter alia
to facilitate and promote by appropriate means:
(a) broad and harmonious cooperation between their respective indus-
tries, in particular in the form of joint ventures;
(b) greater participation by their respective economic operators in the in-
dustrial development of the Contracting Parties on mutually advantageous
terms;
(c) scientific and technological cooperation;
(d) cooperation in the field of energy;
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further states that the EEC will suspend Common Customs
Tariff duties on cocoa butter and soluble coffee to fulfill the
EEC's commitment to the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development ("UNCTAD").9 ° Since the EEC and
Brazil signed this agreement, Brazilian exports to the EEC
have increased by twelve percent and EEC exports to Brazil, by
thirty-three percent.9 '
In 1984, the Community and the Andean Group signed
the Cooperation Agreement Between the European Economic
Community, of the One Part, and the Cartagena Agreement
and the Member Countries Thereof-Bolivia, Colombia, Ecua-
dor, Peru and Venezuela-of the Other Part (the "EEC-An-
dean Group Agreement").9 The EEC-Andean Group Agree-
ment states special areas ofjoint cooperation: development of
farming, industry, and energy; encouragement of scientific and
technological progress; creation of new employment opportu-
(e) cooperation in the agricultural sector;
(0 favourable conditions for the expansion of investment on a basis of ad-
vantage for both Parties;
(g) cooperation in respect of third countries.
Id. art. 3(1)-(2), at 3.
90. See EEC-Brazil Agreement, supra note 10, annex, at 6. In reference to coop-
eration regarding the marketing of cocoa butter and soluble coffee, it states:
1. The Community shall, in pursuance of its offer of generalized pref-
erences as notified to UNCTAD and in accordance with arrangements based
on the conclusions reached within that body, suspend the Common Cus-
toms Tariff duties on the following products, originating in developing
countries....
2. .. . [Qjuotas amounting for 1974, to 21600 tonnes for cocoa butter
... and 18750 tonnes for soluble coffee ....
After the first year of application of the Agreement, the above quotas
shall be increased annually, under the Community system of generalized
preferences, on the basis of the Community's needs and imports; they may
be amended for any changes made in the list of countries to which that sys-
tem applies.
3. If the Community finds that products to which the arrangements
described in point 1 . . . are likely to be particularly harmful to the interests
of Community producers . . . the Common Customs Tariff duties may be
reimposed in part or in whole for the products ....
4. Brazil shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that its policy re-
garding prices and other conditions for the marketing of cocoa butter solu-
ble coffee disturbs neither the internal market of the Community nor its
traditional patterns of trade.
Id. paras. 1-4.
91. See EUROSTAT, EXTERNAL TRADE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 52-53 (1987).
92. See EEC-Andean Group Agreement, supra note 85.
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nities; and advancement of rural development. 93 The agree-
ment also calls for undertakings in the form of joint ventures
between the EEC and the Andean Group.94
In addition, the EEC-Andean Group Agreement calls for
commercial cooperation to maximize trade. The parties have
agreed to study ways to overcome barriers, particularly non-
tariff and quasi-tariff barriers.95 Both sides have consented to
facilitate commercial transactions and to study and recom-
mend trade promotion measures. 96
More recently, the EEC and the Central American nations
signed the Cooperation Agreement Between the European
Economic Community, of the One Part, and the Countries Par-
ties to the General Treaty on Central American Economic In-
tegration (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and
Nicaragua) and Panama, of the Other Part (the "EEC-Central
American Agreement"). 97 The EEC agreed to promote the de-
velopment of industry, agri-industry, and energy; encourage
scientific and technological progress; and create new employ-
ment opportunities in the Central American nations. 98 In or-
der to accomplish these objectives, the parties agreed to ex-
change information, cooperate in the energy field, increase Eu-
ropean investment in Central American countries, establish
joint ventures, 99 and reduce trade barriers.100
The EEC's recent trade agreements provide specific areas
in which the Community will assist development of particular
industries within Latin American countries. They also indicate
specific ways in which the parties will cooperate in regard to
trade.
93. See id. art. 1, at 3.
94. See id.
95. See id. art. 3, at 4.
96. See id.
97. EEC-Central American Agreement, supra note 86.
98. See id. art. 3, at 4.
99. See id.
100. See id. art. 4, at 4-5. During 1987, the EEC gave the five Central American
countries over 82 million ECU in aid, more than in any of the previous five years. See
Spokesman's Group of the Commission of the European Communities, Official Visit
by Mr. Cheysson to Central America, Memo 9/88 (Jan. 29, 1988) (non-attributable)
at 3 (available at the Fordham International Law Journal office). During this year, Com-
munity involvement in Central America included the reactivation of regional projects
and the resettlement of refugees in El Salvador and Guatemala. See id.
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III. PROPOSALS TO ENHANCE THE EEC-MEXICAN
TRADE AGREEMENT
The Mexican economy needs developmental assistance in
order to achieve economic growth and to enable Mexico to re-
pay its foreign debt. 1 ' The EEC, which has recently con-
cluded several trade agreements to accomplish similar goals
with other nations, can be one source of such assistance.10 2
The Community's willingness to use its economic power to as-
sist developing nations and Mexico's need for such assistance
mandate a basis to support a better agreement.
While the Joint Committee furthered the establishment of
contacts between the EEC and Mexican businesses, it was not
effective in increasing non-petroleum exports to the EEC, a
major desire of Mexico.' 0 3 Further, Mexico has decreased its
imports from the EEC, frustrating the Community's objective
of increased trade with Mexico.'0°
For several reasons, the current EEC-Mexican Agreement
has not been successful in increasing EEC investment in Mex-
• 101. See S. WEINTRAUB, supra note 14, at 107 (suggesting that development of
Mexican capital goods industry would create jobs and make Mexico a stronger com-
petitor in world markets); Reyes, supra note 25, at 95-96 (suggesting the Mexico seek
cooperation and trade with modern firms in industrially advanced countries).
102. See generally Reyes, supra note 25, at 87-101 (discussing Mexico's industrial
policy and its relationship to the EEC); see supra note 52 (quoting European Parlia-
ment debate that called for expansion of trade to help countries, such as Mexico, with
difficulties).
103. See De Mateo, supra note 2, at 17. Although the EEC-Mexican Agreement
made it possible for Mexico to export large quantities of oil to some of the European
countries, it has not been effective in ihcreasing Mexico's non-petroleum exports. See
id.
104. See Joint Commission Memo, supra note 27, at 4. Traditionally, in its trade
with Mexico, the Community has run a clear surplus. Id. As a result of Mexico's need
for capital goods to carry out its development program, the Community's exports
were rising. Id. Thus, until 1982, the Community's trade surplus with Mexico
tended to increase. Id. In 1982, the Community's balance of trade with Mexico re-
versed due to Mexico's lessened demand for imports during the recession and an
increase in Mexican petroleum exports. Id.; see DE MATEO, supra note 2, at 18 (noting
that Mexican exports to the EEC have hot risen in the past few years). See id. The
Mexican surplus grew between 1982 and 1984. Id. In 1981, the trade balance be-
tween the EEC and Mexico was + 1226 million ECU. Id. It declined to -35 million
ECU in 1982, and to - 1355 million ECU in 1984. See id. The decrease in oil prices
changed the trend and brought trade almost into balance. See id The trade balance
was -605 million ECU in 1985 and -71 million ECU for the first nine months of
1986. See id. These statistics show a reversal of the balance of trade in favor of the
EEC.
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ico or in increasing non-petroleum trade between the par-
ties. 0 5 First, the agreement states a general goal of trade co-
operation without specifying which sectors of the economy
need to be developed. °6
Second, while the EEC has financed some research
projects10 7 and assisted in some developmental projects,' 8 it
should increase investment in capital projects-a more signifi-
cant promotion of Mexican industry. A lack of financial incen-
tives has not helped to formulate joint ventures.
In contrast to the vague, and therefore ineffectual, nature
of the EEC-Mexican Agreement, other recent EEC develop-
mental agreements have been successful in their specificity.
For example, while the EEC-Mexican Agreement seeks to de-
velop economic cooperation in "fields of mutual interest,"' 0 9
the EEC-Brazil Agreement specifies that the parties would co-
operate in science, technology, energy, and agriculture."10
The Lom6 agreements specify trade cooperation in energy,
food production, mining, fisheries, and industrial develop-
ment." I'
The EEC-Mexican Agreement allows for revision if cir-
cumstances change." 2 The current economic situation in
Mexico, coupled with the EEC's evolution into a single com-
mon market, are factors warranting a change in the EEC-Mexi-
can Agreement. Furthermore, as a most-favored-nation, Mex-
ico should be granted at least the same trade advantages that
the EEC grants to other nations. 113
105. See Coffey, supra note 24, at 33-34 (stating that the EEC-Mexican Agree-
ment is too general); De Mateo, supra note 2, at 17 (noting that the EEC-Mexican
Agreement has not been effective in increasing Mexico's non-petroleum exports); see
also Reyes, supra note 25 at 101 (noting need for new industrial investment in Mexico
by both Mexican and foreign firms).
106. See EEC-Mexican Agreement, supra note 1, art. 3, at 12. Article 3 states:
"[tihe Contracting Parties undertake to promote the development and diversification
of their reciprocal trade to the highest possible level." Id.
107. See Joint Commission Memo, supra note 27, at 3.
108. See id.
109. EEC-Mexican Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4, at 12.
110. EEC-Brazil Agreement, supra note 10, art. 2, at 3.
111. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text (discussing specific areas of
cooperation between EEC and ACP States under Lomb agreements).
112. See EEC-Mexican Agreement, supra note 1, art. 12, at 13.
113. See supra note 17 (quoting EEC-Mexican Agreement's provision on most-
favored-nation treatment, and explaining theory behind this privilege).
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In modifying the EEC-Mexican Agreement, the parties
should specify certain sectors of the Mexican economy that the
EEC will assist in developing. For example, the EEC can facili-
tate the development of modern production facilities in Mex-
ico.'" 4 Increased exports of advanced computer technology
and manufacturing equipment to Mexico would help achieve
this goal.' 15
The EEC should also consider reducing its current trade
restrictions on certain non-petroleum imports from Mexico,
such as honey, tobacco, and coffee."1 6 At the present time,
Mexico does not export these products in large quantities. If
Mexico should increase the number and variety of exports,
however, it will encounter trade restrictions with the General
System of Preferences," 7 which allows for very few trade con-
cessions.' 18
114. See Reyes, supra note 25, at 94-99 (discussing Mexico's need to modernize
its industries); id. at 101 (suggesting that both Mexican and foreign firms must con-
tribute directly to the development of a highly efficient productive structure).
115. See id. at 98 (noting that high speed of technological change on the world
level necessitates application of new technologies to Mexican industries).
It is likely the EEC exports of technology to Mexico will have to comply with
Mexican guidelines for technology transfer. See Ley Sobre el Registro de la Transfer-
encia de Technologia y el Uso y Explotacion de Patentes y Marcas, Piario Oficial,
Dec. 30, 1972, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 421 (1973) (English trans.). The law purports to
set guidelines for the transfer of technology to Mexico. Id. The English translation
of article 2 of the Mexican Technology Transfer Law states:
Registration in the Register referred to in the foregoing article shall be
mandatory for documents embodying instruments, contracts or agreements
of any kind intended to be operative in the national territory and concluded
for the purposes of
(a) the grant of the use of trade-names and trade-marks or of authori-
zation to work them;
(b) the grant of the use of patents of invention, improvements, models
and industrial drawings or of authorization to work them;
(c) the furnishing of technical know-how by means of drawings, dia-
grams, models, guidelines, instructions, formulae, specifications, personnel
training and qualification, or by other means;
(d) the supply of basic or detailed engineering know-how for the set-
ting up of plant or equipment or for the manufacture of products; and/or
(c) technical assistance in any form.
12 I.L.M. at 422. No legal effect is produced by article 2 instruments, agreements, or
contracts that are not registered with the National Register of Technology transfer.
Id. art. 6, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. at 423. As such, they are not enforceable by national
courts and tribunals. Id.
116. See De Mateo, supra note 2, at 15.
117. See id. at 25.
118. See Lodge I, supra note 5, at 144.
EEC-MEXICAN A GREEMENT
A reduction in these restrictions, similar to the reduction
for cocoa butter and soluble coffee in the EEC-Brazil Agree-
ment, would meet demands of both parties.' 19 It would allow
Mexico to derive needed foreign exchange from non-petro-
leum exports and, at the same time, accomplish the EEC's goal
of providing development assistance to Mexico.
CONCLUSION
The present agreement between the EEC and Mexico
does not meet the needs of the parties or take into account the
legal and economic changes that have occurred in both the
EEC and Mexico since 1975.
The EEC's increasing role as a world economic power; its
second expansion to include Spain, Portugal, and Greece and
its dependence on oil imports have dramatically changed the
EEC's international outlook. The Mexican economic recession
and the resulting debt crisis have increased Mexico's need to
revive its economy through manufactured exports.
Since the 1975 EEC-Mexican Agreement, the EEC has
concluded several trade agreements designed to grant specific
trade concessions to developing nations. As part of this pro-
cess, the EEC should reevaluate its trade agreement with Mex-
ico to provide the same types of assistance it now provides
other nations. The time has arrived for a new agreement be-
tween the EEC and Mexico that specifies new areas of coopera-
tion, especially in the fields of Mexican non-petroleum exports
to the EEC and EEC technological exports to Mexico. A new
agreement would facilitate the recovery of the Mexican econ-
omy, provide a market for European goods, and encourage in-
creased commercial interaction between these two suitable
trading partners.
Therese M. Woods*
119. See Coffey, supra note 24, at 33 (suggesting that current EEC-Mexican
Agreement be transformed into something similar to the more specific EEC-Brazil
Agreement).
J.D. candidate, 1990, Fordham University School of Law.
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